Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Arnauld / Nicole and Dale Jacquette

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40 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
9456 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
7689 The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
9457 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
7681 Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
9463 Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
7682 Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
7697 On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9466 Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
9465 Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
9458 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
9461 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
7701 Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
7707 To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
7687 Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
7692 Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
10502 We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
7679 Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
7678 Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
7683 Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
7684 Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
7703 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
7685 An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
7699 Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
7688 The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
7695 Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
7694 We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
18258 We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
16784 Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7706 If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
10499 We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10501 A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
10500 No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7704 Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
9460 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
9459 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
7702 The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]